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Comment
Counsel and Contempt: A Suggestion
That the Summary Power Be Eliminated
I. INTRODUCTION
Before any system of resolving disputes can achieve "justice," it
must function in an orderly, disciplined fashion.' To preserve court-
room order and decorum, the courts in the Anglo-American system of
law possess the power to punish, as criminal contempt," individuals
whose conduct is incongruous with the desired ends of promoting
order and respect in the courtroom. Traditionally, it had been urged
that summary punishment' of contempt was an inherent power of all
1. Order and discipline are considered necessary elements of any functional justice
system. See Note, Criminal Law-Contempt- Conduct of Attorney During Course of
Trial, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 329 [hereinafter cited as Conduct of Attorney]. See also Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs];
Note, Attorneys and the Summary Contempt Sanction, 25 ME. L. REV. 89 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Summary Contempt Sanction).
2. "Contempt generally, is defined as an act or omission substantially disrupting the
judicial process in a particular case." Dobbs, supra note 1, at 185. The basic end of con-
tempt law, with respect to disruption in court, is avoiding interruption of, and insult to,
the judicial process. See People v. Gholson, 412 11. 294, 298, 106 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1952).
"Criminal contempt" is traditionally defined as one form of contempt of court done "in
disrespect of the court or its process or which obstruct[s] the administration of justice or
tend[s] to bring the court into disrespect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (Rev. 4th ed.
1968). For the most part, contumacious acts are generally classified as civil or criminal. In
a criminal contempt, the contempt sentence, which is usually for a fixed period of time, is
for punishment of completed conduct. In a civil contempt, the court imprisons the contem-
nor until he agrees to comply with an order of the court. Note, The Application of
Criminal Contempt Procedures to Attorneys, 64 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 301 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as The Application of Criminal Contempt]. This has been generally con-
sidered the "punishment" test. In Pennsylvania, the distinction has been recently articu-
lated as follows: if the purpose of the contempt citation is to vindicate the dignity and
authority of the court, the citation is one for criminal contempt, but, if the citation's pur-
pose is to coerce the contemnor into compliance with an order of the court, the citation is
for civil contempt. In re "B," 482 Pa. 471, 476-77, 394 A.2d 419, 421 (1978). See also
Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). See generally R. GOLDFARB,
THE CONTEMPT POWER 181 (1963); Dobbs, supra note 1, at 235-49. For definitions of
"direct" and "indirect" contempt, see note 6 infra.
3. The United States Supreme Court in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952),
has defined summary action as "a procedure which dispenses with the formality, delay
and digression that would result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and
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courts.' Recent research has revealed, however, that summary con-
tempt may not have been an inherent power of common law courts,
and, in fact, exists only as an historical aberration or accident.' Today,
this power is utilized only for direct contempt, involving occurrences of
disruption in the court's presence. Justification of summary contempt
power is presently premised on a two-fold rationale: first, the power
gives the trial judge a means of preserving order in the courtroom,
and, second, the procedure eliminates a wasting of administrative re-
sources.' In the shadow of the appropriately high regard our legal sys-
tem places in orderly courtroom procedures lies the zealous advocate
who is obligated to protect the interests of his client.' But, balanced
answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, sub-
mission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional trial." Id. at 9.
4. This inherent power was said to be derived not from statute but from the nature
of the judicial function. Without the power to punish those who declined to obey its rul-
ings and orders, the court was viewed as unable to act effectively at judicial proceedings.
See The Application of Criminal Contempt, supra note 2, at 300.
5. Although leading articles, treatises and case law of most states, including Penn-
sylvania, continue to characterize the contempt power of the court as "inherent," recent
research has exploded the myths that contempt was an inherent power of the courts and
that summary proceedings were utilized from time immemorial. See Conduct of Attorney,
supra note 1, at 341-42. See also Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the
Summary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 948 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as A Case Study]. Blackstone's Commentaries was the primary source of the
view that the power to summarily punish contempt was inherent in all courts based on
the rationale that such power was essential and integral to courtroom order. See 5 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 282-88 (1803). See also Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303
(1888). However, severe and continual challenges to the historical validity of Blackstone's
justification led to the realization by Justice Black, in a strong dissent criticizing the sum-
mary nature of the contempt power, that "[tihe power of a judge to inflict punishment for
criminal contempt by means of a summary proceeding stands as an anomaly in the law."
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
6. A "direct contempt" is defined as one committed in the presence of the court
while it is in session. An "indirect contempt," on the other hand, is one committed outside
the presence of the court tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass
the court in the administration of justice. See generally 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 3 (1963).
7. The argument in support of the "administration of resources" rationale is that,
since the judge has personally observed the contemnor's misbehavior, a second trial is not
necessary. Essentially, time and economics appear to be the justifications for denying the
right to an impartial adjudication of contempt charges. See Summary Contempt Sanction,
supra note 1, at 91.
8. The Canons of Professional Ethics require all attorneys to apply their "entire
devotion to the interest of their client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights . . . [N]o fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from
the full discharge of his duty." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 15. See Robin-
son, Use of the Contempt Power Against Lawyers in Michigan, 51 MICH. ST. B.J. 659, 661
(1972). See also Summary Contempt Sanction supra note 1, at 93 (the attorney must
represent every client vigorously and diligently according to law and standards of profes-
sional conduct).
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against his role as an advocate is his role as a court officer, whose
duties include preserving the dignity and integrity of the judicial insti-
tution.
This comment will analyze the summary contempt power enjoyed by
the court and will specifically address the power's potential for abuse.
Because summary contempt power effectively deprives the litigating
attorney of certain constitutional protections,9 he is placed in an unten-
able position which requires him to choose between his duty as an offi-
cer of the court and his role as an advocate; this chilling effect on
proper and effective trial advocacy0 and the deprivation of constitu-
tional guarantees" will be the focus of the comment. Finally, the inef-
fectiveness of the sanction in controlling attorney misbehavior will be
discussed, with the conclusion calling for the elimination of the sum-
mary contempt power in our judicial system.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT
A. Constitutional Concerns
The so-called "inherent" power of courts to summarily punish indi-
viduals for contumacious conduct was said to have been derived from
the nature of the judicial function. In Blackstone's Commentaries, com-
monly considered the primary source for this view, it was asserted
that this power was essential to courtroom order. 2 The United States
Supreme Court, in Ex parte Terry," expressly adopted the rule that
the summary power to cite and punish contempts tending to obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice is inherent in all courts.
Distinguishing between direct and indirect contempt, the Terry Court
held that, although proceedings without notice are not judicial or wor-
9. It is at once apparent that a non-jury, "no-notice," on the spot, summary proceed-
ing in front of the trial judge, who, due to the "heat of battle," may be anything but fair
and impartial, raises serious constitutional questions. See A Case Study, supra note 5, at
947. See also Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt. A Suggestion That Due Process
Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 464
(1966).
10. See A Case Study, supra note 5, at 950. As a member of the bar and an officer of
the court, the attorney has a duty to see that justice prevails in the courtroom. However,
there may exist irreconcilable differences between the attorney's function as a court offi-
cer and a client defender. See Summary Contempt Sanction, supra note 1, at 93; Conduct
of Attorney, supra note 1, at 335, 342-43.
11. It is repeatedly asserted that "[flew devices conflict within the lines of our Con-
stitution with the ubiquity of the contempt power." Goldfarb, The Constitution and Con-
tempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 283 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb].
12. 5 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 280-83 (1803). See also notes 4 & 5 supra.
13. 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
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thy of respect," notice and hearing are not required in the case of
direct contempt because of the concern for an ordered society.15 The
Terry Court then concluded that its holding was based upon a rule of
"immemorial antiquity.""6
The substantive power of federal courts to impose summary crimi-
nal contempt is embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 401.17 Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure' 8 provides for immediate punishment of
14. Id. at 307.
15. Id. at 307-09.
16. Id. at 307.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) reads in pertinent part as follows:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment,
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or
command.
The Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a substantially similar contempt statute and the
Pennsylvania courts have developed summary contempt law along similar lines as has the
federal system. The Pennsylvania statutory treatment of contempt classifies summary
contempt as follows:
The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments and to
inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the
following cases:
(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively.
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the
lawful process of the court.
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby
obstructing the administration of justice.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4131 (Purdon Pamp. 1979). See also Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa.
370, 127 A.2d 669 (1956) ("direct criminal contempt"); In re Carroll, 393 A.2d 993 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978) (vitality of summary criminal contempt proceedings); Commonwealth v.
Harris, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 8, 168 A.2d 761 (1961) (inherent power of the courts).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Rule 42(a) reads as follows:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw
or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the ac-
tual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be
signed by the judge and entered of record.
The Pennsylvania Judicial Code also makes provision for summary treatment of contempt
charges. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4131, 4135 (Purdon Pamp. 1979). Section 4131,
quoted at note 17 supra, outlines the circumstances under which a court is empowered to
inflict summary punishment for incidents of direct contempt. Section 4135 outlines the
procedures to be followed in adjudicating charges of indirect contempt. This latter section
provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.-In all cases where a person shall be charged with indirect
criminal contempt for violation of a restraining order or injunction issued by a
court or judge, the accused shall enjoy:
(1) The rights as to admission to bail that are accorded to persons accused of
Vol. 18:289
1980 Counsel and Contempt
direct contempts committed in the presence of the court."1 In the Rule
42(a) summary hearing, there is no indictment, no information, no jury
and sometimes no testimony;' in short, the summary procedure con-
tains none of the "trappings" and, unfortunately, none of the constitu-
tional protections of a typical criminal trial.
Of principal concern in the constitutional context is the inconsistency
between the summary contempt power and the due process and trial
by jury provisions of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments."
One policy argument for summary contempt power which allegedly
justifies the lesser degree of concern for the contemnor's constitutional
rights is administrative convenience. However, as Justice Black so
appropriately stated in his dissent in Green v. United States,'
crime.
(2) The right to be notified of the accusation and a reasonable time to make a
defense, if the alleged contempt is not committed in the immediate view or pres-
ence of the court.
(3)(i) Upon demand, the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury
of the judicial district wherein the contempt shall have been committed.
(ii) The requirement of subparagraph (i) shall not be construed to apply to
contempts:
(A) committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to
interfere directly with the administration of justice, or to apply to the
misbehavior, misconduct, or disobedience of any officer of the court in
respect to the writs, orders, or process of the court; ....
Ld. § 4135 (emphasis added).
19. The'Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 42(a) describe the rule as "substantially a
restatement of the existing law." 28 U.S.C. app. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) (1976). The Commit-
tee cited Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888), in which the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the summary contempt conviction against an attorney who had assaulted a
United States Marshal in the courtroom. In so ruling, the Terry Court stated that "the ad-
ministration of justice would be in continual danger of being thwarted by the lawless." Id.
at 303. The Committee also cited Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), which re-
versed the contempt conviction of an attorney who sent a contemptuous letter to a judge
since the court did not have to "act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or
physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring in open court." Id. at 534.
20. Dobbs, supra note 1, at 221. Compare the summary procedure for direct contempt
in FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4135
(Purdon Pamp. 1979) both of which provide, inter alia, for the minimal due process pro-
cedures of prior notice and a hearing by an impartial judge for charges of indirect
criminal contempt.
21. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, and XIV. In Goldfarb, supra note 11, the author raises
several constitutional challenges to the summary nature of the contempt power: these in-
clude the-fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment questions of due process and trial by
jury; first amendment questions of free speech; freedom of religion and of the press;
fourth amendment questions of unreasonable search and seizure; eighth amendment prob-
lems of "cruel and unusual punishment"; and tenth amendment questions of federal-state
relations. The focus of this comment is limited to the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amend-
ment questions of due process and trial by jury.
22. 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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"[ciheap, easy convictions were not the primary concern of those who
adopted the Constitution and Bill of Rights.""
Generally, the due process requirements embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments mandate some minimum standards by which
governmental proceedings must comply with contemporary notions of
fairness and justice.24 Under the power to summarily punish contemp-
tuous conduct, however, several due process notions are nullified:
namely, a fair trial, a fair tribunal and the absence of actual bias.25
Moreover, the United States Constitution provides for the trial by jury
of all criminal cases except those involving impeachment," and it is not
clear how summary contempt power, an anomaly in the law," can be
squared with this constitutional guarantee.28 Although the sound policy
of stare decisis directs adherence to prior decisions, this practice
should not be so inflexible as to preclude the correction of an obvious
error-an unyielding power which has been retained by historical acci-
dent." The jury's role, as an indispensible element in the popular vin-
dication of criminal law, permits public participation in disputes and,
more importantly, serves as an insulation between the accused and the
judge.' To allow the offended judge, in a criminal citation, to act as
"victim, prosecutor, judge and jury" is fundamentally unfair. 1 It is not
enough that summary judgment be regarded with disfavor; 2 its inher-
23. Id at 216 (Black, J., dissenting).
24. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury ... ;). Similar language appears in the sixth amendment: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury ... ." Id. amend. VI.
27. See note 5 supra.
28. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (jury trial for all contempts resulting in
punishment for six months or more is guaranteed). This rule is easily circumvented when
a judge labels each contemptuous act a separate judgment and attaches separate sen-
tences of under six months in length. See Summary Contempt Sanction, supra note 1, at
96 n.37. See also notes 53-54 and accompanying text infra.
29. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 195-98 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Gold-
farb, supra note 11, at 289.
30. See generally Frankfurter & Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010 (1924).
31. See Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 290. ("The general public may look with skepti-
cism upon a judicial process which allows one man to be victim, prosecutor, judge and
jury").
32. There has, indeed, been a trend toward viewing summary contempt with dis-
favor. See Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 296 ("The contempt power is an extraordinary
remedy, an exception to our tradition of fair and complete hearings. Its use should be
carefully restricted ...."). Accord, Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167 (1949) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). See also Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954) ("The grant
of summary contempt power . . . is to be grudgingly construed, so that instances where
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ent repugnancy to the Constitution requires the elimination of the pro-
cedure.'
B. Supreme Court Decisions
Sacher v. United States ' was the first major judicial test of the
summary contempt power provided in Rule 42(a). In Sacher, the trial
judge at the conclusion of the trial found the defendants and their
counsel guilty of summary contempt. On appeal from those contempt
judgments, the Supreme Court conceded that its decision could not be
based upon the need for maintaining courtroom order and decorum,
since the trial had ended. Instead, the majority's decision, in upholding
the conviction of contempt, focused on the waste of judicial resources
rationale; that is, since the trial judge personally witnesses the con-
duct in quo, there is no need to encumber the courts with another
trial.
In his dissent in Sacher, Justice Black planted the seeds of constitu-
tional challenge to summary contempt power when he noted that there
is an effective denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial and due
process of law where the same judge not only indicts the attorney for
contempt but also adjudicates the contempt violation.' Because courts
in subsequent cases have agreed with Justice Black and recognized the
constitutional infirmities present in the summary contempt power, the
majority's holding in Sacher has been continuously eroded. For exam-
ple, in Offut v. United States,3 7 a post-trial contempt conviction, based
upon personal exchanges with the trial judge, was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the trial judge
became "personally embroiled" with the alleged contemnor.Y In so rul-
ing, the Court stated that a post-trial summary proceeding will be in-
there is no right to a jury trial will be narrowly restricted. ); United States ex reL
Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972) (where the line between zealous advocacy
and actual obstruction of justice "defies strict delineation, doubts should be resolved in
favor of vigorous advocacy").
33. One leading commentator is quite adament in this regard: "The Constitution is
specific and clear. Criminal contempt should be tried as other crimes are-with all pro-
cedural guarantees protecting the accused. There should be a right to a jury trial of the
charged contempt." Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 299. See also Green v. United States, 356
U.S. at 193-94 (Black, J., dissenting); note 84 infra.
34. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 14-18 (Black, J., dissenting). See also A Case Study, supra note 5, at 947
(summary contempt power permits the judge citing for contempt to also adjudicate the
case and, without notice, hearing, or other rudimentary features of due process of law, to
find the offender guilty).
37. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
38. Id. at 14, 17.
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validated where bias can be shown on the part of the trial judge.'
However, the problem created by Offut was obvious: under the holding
of that case, the judge whose bias was in question determined, ab
initio, whether or not he could be impartial."'
The later case of Mayberry v. Pennsylvania" provided some relief to
this situation. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the contempt
conviction of a defendant for misconduct during trial. Ruling that the
trial judge should have requested another judge to adjudicate the con-
tempt charges, the Court stated that when unseemly conduct toward
the trial judge is readily apparent, bias on the part of the trial judge in
later contempt proceedings would be presumed." Although this more
objective standard for determining the existence of bias served to
clarify, at least to some extent, the ambiguity created by the Offut
decision, the Mayberry decision did not completely alleviate the con-
stitutional problems associated with the use of summary contempt
power. In certain circumstances, the trial judge still retains the power
to act, in effect, as judge, jury, and sentencer. Furthermore, the para-
doxical situation arises whereby a defendant whose conduct is less in-
sulting and whose guilt, therefore, less certain has less of a chance to
protect his due process procedural guarantees vis-a-vis an unbiased
judge;" although clearly insulting a trial judge will probably assure
one before the court of a full hearing before another judge, the same
treatment will not be prompted by less disrespectful conduct. In this
regard, an already accused contemnor is encouraged to show further
disrespect to secure greater procedural protection." Under Offut and
Mayberry, then, where the conduct of the alleged contemnor includes a
39. Id. at 15-16.
40. See 4 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 92 (1970). See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
522 (1927) (to subject a defendant to a trial in a criminal case involving his liberty or prop-
erty before a judge having a direct, personal, substantial interest in convicting him is a
denial of due process of law).
41. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
42. Under Mayberry, a presumption of embroilment exists where there is a con-
tumacious byplay between the alleged contemnor and the trial judge. See Summary Con-
tempt Sanction, supra note 1, at 92. In a recent Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v.
Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855 (1976), the court held that where the judge is personally
attacked by defendant's allegedly contumacious behavior, the Constitution requires that
post-trial contempt proceedings be held before a judge that had not been directly sub-
jected to the abuse. See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4135(a)(4) (Purdon Pamp. 1979),
which provides that the defendant shall have "the right to file with the court a demand
for the withdrawal of the judge sitting in the proceeding, if the contempt arises from an
attack upon the character or conduct of such judge ... "
43. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 226 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
DISORDER IN THE COURT].
44. A Case Study, supra note 5, at 994 n.172.
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personal attack on the trial judge carrying such potential for bias that
he is not likely to maintain calm detachment for a fair adjudication, the
trial judge must disqualify himself from the contempt proceeding if he
waits until the conclusion of trial to rule on the contempt.
Although the courts concede that in the case of a personal attack
the possible prejudice to the accused overrides any economy of effort
that would be achieved by a summary procedure, this same concession
is not evidenced where a non-personal attack is present. In Ungar v.
Sarafite,"5 the United States Supreme Court, in upholding a criminal
conviction for contempt imposed summarily by the judge before whom
the contempt allegedly occurred, held that criticism of the court's rul-
ings and failure to obey court orders did not constitute a personal
attack on the trial judge so as to require the judge's disqualification in
post-trial contempt proceedings. In Ungar, the defendant was an attor-
ney who was testifying as an important prosecution witness in a con-
spiracy and conflict of interests case. The Ungar Court ruled that the
defendant's statements that he was being "coerced and intimidated
and badgered" by the trial judge and that "the court is suppressing
the evidence" did not preclude the trial judge from acting without
prejudice."6 In determining the presence or absence of bias, the Ungar
majority apparently gave no consideration to the trial judge's charac-
terization of the defendant's conduct as being "not only contemptuous
but disorderly and insolent." 7 Instead, the Supreme Court in Ungar
drew an arbitrary distinction between conduct which constitutes a per-
sonal attack and conduct which is disruptive, recalcitrant and disagree-
able, 8 concluding that the former requires the judge's removal from
the post-trial contempt proceeding, but that the latter does not.
Another early distinction outlined by the Supreme Court in the con-
tempt area was the difference between direct and indirect contempts.4 9
Summary power, under the pre-Sacher case of Cooke v. United
States,' is determined unwarranted in instances of indirect contempt
because once the trial is terminated, for example, no legitimate inter-
est is served by permitting the court to summarily punish and convict
for contempt. In such cases of indirect contempt there is no trial which
will be interrupted, thereby rendering moot the rationales for use of
summary power, which include the wasting of judicial resources and
45. 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
46. d. at 580, 583-84.
47. d. at 580.
48. Id. at 584.
49. See notes 6, 15 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
50. 267 U.S. 517 (1925). Cooke, an indirect contempt case, concerned the contents of a
contumacious letter written by an attorney, advising the judge of his client's desire to
have another judge try the case.
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the maintenance of courtroom order and decorum. The concern is that
post-trial summary contempt proceedings and convictions peculiarly
lend themselves to charges that the court is exacting personal venge-
ance. 1 However, although this argument is particularly persuasive
with respect to indirect contempts, its application is also pertinent
with respect to direct contempts in light of the pervading constitu-
tional challenges in any summary procedure; since in both direct and
indirect contempt situations there is an accusation, both situations re-
quire notice, opportunity to defend and a hearing before an impartial
tribunal. Providing these due process safeguards for indirect violations
but denying them for direct violations appears, therefore, to be
another arbitrarily drawn discrimination in the contempt area.
It is now well-settled that jury trials for criminal contempt are
guaranteed the alleged contemnors who may be imprisoned for more
than six months. This question was settled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Bloom v. Illinois.2 In that case, the Court recognized that
the power of courts to summarily punish contempt must be balanced
against the contemnor's due process rights. More importantly, how-
ever, the Court acknowledged that an alleged contemnor retains his
constitutional rights in a summary contempt proceeding. Unfortunately,
the express holding of Bloom, requiring a jury trial if the potential
sentence is in excess of six months, can be easily circumvented by
classifying each contemptuous act separately and imposing a distinct
sentence of six months or less for each act.63 Thus, the jury trial
guarantee under Bloom is, in reality, no guarantee at all.
The Court's decision in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania' provided some
relief to this situation by invalidating non-jury trial, post-verdict con-
victions accumulating over six months. Nevertheless, the potential still
remains for non-jury trial summary contempt proceedings where the
contempt sentences are meted out during trial. The Codispoti majority
rationalized that to require accumulation of contempt sentences im-
posed during trial would hinder the trial judge in controlling the court-
room.' However, Justice Marshall's partial concurrence recognized
that the potential for arbitrary, biased, and prejudicial action on the
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855 (1976).
52. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
53. By classifying each such act distinctively, contemnors can be subjected to an ac-
cumulated period of imprisonment beyond the six-month limit of Bloom without having
been afforded a jury trial. 4 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 92 (1970). See, e.g., In re Dellinger,
461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), wherein attorney William Kunstler was found guilty of
twenty-four separate acts of contempt with sentencing ranging from seven days to six
months; the total time of imprisonment, due to consecutive sentencing, was four years,
thirteen days.
54. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
55. Id at 514-15.
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part of the trial judge is present in both mid-trial and post-trial con-
tempt adjudications.'
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER
AND EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY
The theoretical dilemma surrounding the summary contempt power
is further compounded when the alleged contemnor is an attorney, for
the attorney in our system of justice is faced with dual and potentially
conflicting roles. As an officer of the court, he must not transcend the
bounds of decency and dignity so essential to an orderly administration
of justice." On the other hand, he is required to zealously, fearlessly
and persistently uphold the rights of his client. The vitality of the
adversary structure of the American judicial system depends, to a
large extent, on the attorney's zealous representation of his client.' It
is suggested here that the existence of the present summary contempt
power stifles effective, vigorous, and zealous advocacy.
The underlying requisite for conduct to be held contemptuous is
that it must be considered "obstructive" in some manner. The dividing
line, however, between what is and what is not obstructive is anything
but clear, 9 and absent definite guidelines" counsel may become very
56. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in part). Justice Marshall felt that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial should be applicable in both situations; he wrote: "Indeed,
the Court's suggestion provides an incentive for a trial judge to act in the heat of the
moment, and thus encourages the very arbitrary action which it is the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment to eliminate." Id. See also United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), a case which involved the post-trial conviction and sentencing of an attorney
for stating that the judge had predetermined the defendant's guilt. The court reversed a
conviction of summary contempt because the judge delayed charging the alleged contem-
nor until after the trial, and since the conviction was not imposed until after the trial, the
court rationalized that the summary procedure was not employed to restore order in the
courtroom. However, the Meyer court refused to completely eliminate the summary con-
tempt procedure; indeed, the court stated that where immediate action becomes necessary
to restore order, summary procedure would be preferable to holding subsequent hearings.
Three circumstances would, according to Meyer, rebut the presumption in favor of a mid-
trial exercise of summary contempt procedure: namely, the personal involvement of the
trial judge, actions which would naturally destroy the objectivity of an outwardly calm
trial judge, or the judge's overt adoption of an adversary posture toward the contemnor.
57. See Conduct of Attorney, supra note 1, at 342. ("As an essential actor in the
American legal system, counsel necessarily owes a duty to that system to refrain from
disorderly and disrespectful conduct"). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TY, EC 7-19 (duty of the lawyer to the adversary system of justice) and EC 7-36 (balancing
the need for zealous representation with the need for maintaining the decorum and dig-
nity of the proceedings). See generally A Case Study, supra note 5, at 949.
58. See Conduct of Attorney, supra note 1, at 343.
59. Id. ("Unfortunately, the moment at which zealous advocacy becomes contumacious
conduct is no more certain than the point at which deference to the value of order
becomes abdication as advocate").
60. Determination of what is and is not obstructive ultimately rests on a case-by-case
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apprehensive over arguing in a particular manner or persistently
stating a point on behalf of and in the best interest of his client.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of
Operating Engineers,"' is illustrative of the potentially adverse effect
summary power may have upon effective and zealous trial advocacy. In
that case, the court of appeals held that an attorney's insistence on
stating reasons for excepting to the trial court's sustaining of an objec-
tion to the trial attorney's method of cross-examining a witness justi-
fied the entering of a criminal contempt order against him. The attorney
disregarded repeated orders from the trial judge not to state his
specific reasons for exception, asserting his belief that he was justifi-
ably compelled to make his exception specific in order to protect the
record for his client. 2 Although the trial court and the court of appeals
considered the attorney's disregarding the judge's direct orders as the
contemptuous conduct, the trial attorney's right to be contentious,
fearless, and zealous would necessarily seem to include the assurance
that evidentiary issues based on adverse trial court rulings will be pre-
served for appeal. The Local 542 court concluded that despite the fact
that compliance with the judge's rulings may cause counsel, and his
client, to lose an advantage that may never be regained, that loss is a
small premium to pay to protect the judicial system from courtroom
chaos." However, although the importance of courtroom order may
never be underestimated, the court's characterization of a "never to be
regained advantage" may be anything but a "small premium" to the
litigant who is denied justice on appeal because of an inadequately
preserved record.
In recognition of the attorney's essential role as a zealous advocate,
the United States Supreme Court, in In re McConnell" attempted to
set forth a workable standard for determining how far an attorney
could go before the contempt power could be imposed, holding that
only when the conduct becomes an "actual obstruction of justice" may
summary contempt power properly be imposed." The McConnell Court
analysis. Summary Contempt Sanction, supra note 1, at 93.
61. 552 F.2d 498 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
62. Id. at 504-05.
63. Id. at 509.
64. The Supreme Court, in In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962), appreciated that it
was "essential to a fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest,
good faith efforts to present their client's cases, [and that] an independent judiciary and a
vigorous independent bar are both indispensible parts of our system of justice." Id. at 236.
65. The McConnell Court reaffirmed the principle initially enunciated in Ex parte
Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919): "An obstruction to the performance of judicial duty
resulting from an act done in the presence of the court is . . . the characteristic upon
which the power to punish for contempt must rest."
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took full cognizance of the balancing of interests that was involved,
noting that the search for the essential elements of the crime of con-
tempt must be made with full appreciation of the contentious role of
the trial advocate and his duty to zealously represent his client's inter-
ests. Although the McConnell decision cannot be read as an immuniza-
tion for all conduct undertaken by an attorney in good faith represen-
tation of his client, it does require that attorneys be given great
latitude in the area of vigorous advocacy." Unfortunately, the McCon-
nell decision did not totally eliminate the due process problems associ-
ated with summary contempt as it relates to the courtroom conduct of
an attorney, since under McConnell, the trial judge initially decides
what constitutes an "actual obstruction of justice.""7
Recently, in the Chicago Seven Conspiracy Contempt cases," the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit espoused a test which paid
strong heed to the concern over deterring zealous advocacy by means
of the unrestricted use of summary contempt power. Admitting that
the line between vigorous advocacy and obstruction of justice defies
strict delineation, the Seventh Circuit would resolve doubts in favor of
advocacy and limit findings of contempt to instances in which the at-
torney knew or should have known that his conduct would obstruct
justice. 9 In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals recognized
that summary contempt proceedings are inappropriate if the trial
judge fails to take immediate action on the contempts since the
"maintenance of order" rationale cannot be determinative."0 The cases
were remanded for hearings before impartial judges because the defen-
dants' remarks involved personal criticism of the trial judge, thereby
invoking the presumption of bias set forth in the Mayberry case.71
It is fortunate that the "obstruction of justice" test espoused by the
United States Supreme Court in McConnell72 was considered by the
Seventh Circuit in light of the great latitude which must be given at-
torneys in the area of advocacy: specifically, that attorneys have a
right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to
the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in their client's behalf."3
66. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1972).
67. See Summary Contempt Sanction, supra note 1, at 93. ("The degree of departure
in attorney conduct ultimately rests with the trial judge").
68. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit perceptively recognized the attorney's right "[tjo be persistent, vocifer-
ous, contentious and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in
his client's behalf." Id at 400.
69. Id at 400.
70. Id. at 392-93.
71. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 64 supra.
73. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
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It is questionable whether many attorneys would act so dogmatically
when they are faced with an individual who has the power to cite, con-
vict and punish those before him for an alleged "obstruction of
justice." Even though it has been argued that appellate review is a
potential safeguard against the arbitrary use of the contempt power in
stifling vigorous representation," the appellate courts are often hesi-
tant to reverse;"M as Justice Black noted, review of criminal contempt
convictions by an appellate court is largely "impotent" because review
is based on a "cold record," and appellate court judges are reluctant to
overturn contempt convictions imposed by their brethren."'
However, where a different judge hears the case of contempt based
on a citation from a trial judge, an attorney will not have to fear that
his overzealousness will result in a criminal record on the spot. The
combined deterrent effect of the citation itself, the effect on the jury,
and the repercussions from the legal community" on disruptive con-
duct in the courtroom will be at least as great as a summary contempt
proceeding. Parenthetically, it is submitted that, if an attorney is
determined to disrupt any trial, he will probably do so whether punish-
ment is immediate or relatively forthcoming. Summary proceedings
would be of little avail in such a case since the only remedy would be
to remove counsel from the courtroom." This conclusion is buttressed
by a recent empirical study which showed that the summary contempt
power plays substantially no part in deterring attorney misbehavior."
IV. CONCLUSION-ELIMINATION OF THE POWER
Notwithstanding those situations in which due process safeguards
will be available for alleged contemnors, such as in the case of indirect
74. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. at 12-13 ("The [legal] profession knows that
no lawyer is at the mercy of a single federal trial judge. This case demonstrates that
before punishment takes effect he may have appeal on law and fact to the Court of Ap-
peals"). See also Conduct of Attorney, supra note 1, at 350 ("Traditionally it has been
urged that a safeguard on the possibility of intimidation of zealous advocacy is the ex-
istence of appellate review").
75. As one commentator indicates, "[tihe detached review of a contempt decision by
an appellate court whose members are sometimes sympathetic to their brethren of the
lower trial courts, and are often hesitant to reverse in absence of clear and serious error,
is to some viewers an impotent and idle ceremony." Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 290
(emphasis added).
76. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 200 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. See Conduct of Attorney, supra note 1, at 352 n.95 ("While the non-lawyer will
pay a fine or serve a sentence, counsel, in addition to being vulnerable to these sanctions,
remains subject to intra-professional discipline, the ramifications of which may far exceed
those of legal sanction").
78. Conduct of Attorney, supra note 1, at 353-54.
79. See DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 43, at 233.
Vol. 18:289
Counsel and Contempt
contempt, post-trial convictions, and situations in which "personal em-
broilment" is found on the part of the trial judge, the rule in the
federal system and in the state courts, including Pennsylvania, is that
mid-trial exercise of the summary contempt power is still an inherent
power of all courts." Those cases which have eroded the unrestricted
power referred to in Sacher have placed more and more limitations on
the right of a trial judge, engaged in combat, to act as judge, jury, and
sentencer. Nevertheless, these cases have failed to take the final, con-
stitutionally imperative step of eliminating completely the summary
contempt procedure. One commentator perceptively notes that sum-
mary conviction appears quite clearly to violate fundamental norms of
due process in that guilt is determined and punishment inflicted with-
out providing an opportunity to prepare and present a defense before
an impartial tribunal." The judiciary's interest in preserving orderly
judicial process and vindicating the authority and dignity of the court
may surely be effectuated by a method more consistent with the spirit
and letter of the Constitution. Indeed, one such method, analogous to a
Rule 42(b)8" hearing in the federal system, which provides for a hearing
before an impartial judge, will be discussed further. However, to retain
the present summary contempt system ignores two basic implications
of due process referred to by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in
Sacher: specifically, that no judge should sit in a case in which he is
personally involved, and that no criminal punishment should be meted
out except upon notice and hearing."
The anomalous procedure by which a trial judge, often the personal
subject of the contempt, acts as judge, prosecutor, jury, and sentencer
destroys the alleged contemnor's due process rights."M Although, as has
been noted, under Offut and Mayberry the personal embroilment of
the trial judge may rebut the presumption in favor of the validity of a
80. See notes 38, 39 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
81. See Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion That Due Process
Requires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 463,
463-64 (1966).
82. See note 20 supra.
83. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 29 (1932) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
84. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), which upheld a conviction of
summary contempt, relying on the long line of cases to the effect that certain criminal
contempts are not subject to jury trials. In his dissent, Justice Black articulated:
When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, jury and disciplinarian
are thrust upon a judge he is obviously incapable of holding the scales of justice
perfectly fair and true and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause. The defendant charged with
criminal contempt is thus denied ... an indispensible element of the due process of
law ....
Id. at 199 (Black, J., dissenting).
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mid-trial contempt citation, 5 it is not difficult to conceive of the stone-
faced judge whose mental processes we may never perceive.' In most
situations, the trial judge is so involved in the controversy and alleged
contemptuous conduct that he is unable to act without prejudice.
What is suggested here as an alternative to the summary nature of
mid-trial contempt proceedings is a constitutionally acceptable hearing
where the alleged contemnor receives notice, has an opportunity to
prepare a defense, and has the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence
decided by an impartial tribunal. A shift in judicial personnel will cer-
tainly be more calculated to insure fairness. 7 Unfortunately, the axiom
that no man should judge his own cause" has not found acceptance in
summary criminal contempt cases. Thus, the paradoxical situation ex-
ists whereby a wealthy judge must disqualify himself on the basis of a
minor pecuniary interest but may decide a case involving matters
which may have a deep and profound effect upon his emotional attach-
ments."9
The reasons advanced for retention of the summary rule are, in
essence, precedent, judicial self-defense and respect, and efficiency.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the summary power
may be arbitrary in nature and subject to abuse, the "settled doctrine"
of both England and the United States as well as the necessity for
orderly administration of justice, allegedly justified the Court's im-
mediate acceptance of the power." However, the United States Consti-
tution guarantees to a defendant in all criminal proceedings notice of
any charges against him, a hearing on those charges, and a jury trial.
None of these constitutional protections are afforded to the defendant
charged with criminal contempt in a summary proceeding." To ration-
alize that summary contempt is an exception which has been carved
out to necessitate order in the courtroom not only tips the protective
85. See notes 38, 39 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
86. Just as with other men, "[We] can never know the mental processes by which a
judge has acted." Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 331.
87. Id. Mr. Goldfarb posits that the Supreme Court has often referred to the human
qualities of judges by which they, as others, are subject to fallibilities and frailties, such
as anger, petulance, and even vengeance. To him, the more reasonable conclusion is that
the impersonal authority of law is better guarded and applied by one who is not himself
personally involved in a given conflict. Id.
88. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).
89. Address by Edmond Cahn at the New York University Law School (November,
1969), cited with approval in Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 332. See also Summary Contempt
Sanction, supra note 1, at 95.
90. See Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
91. Id at 307.
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balance provided by the Constitution drastically against the alleged
contemnor, but, ironically, is unwarranted by empirical evidence.2
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that some form of deterrence
must exist to keep the workings of the judicial system from disinte-
grating into complete disarray. What is suggested here, however, is
that the threat of a later conviction, especially for an attorney, will
have as much of a deterrent effect against obstructing the judicial
process as will a conviction summarily imposed. To maintain courtroom
order, the trial judge would retain the power to cite for contempt;
whereas, an impartial judge or jury, at the conclusion of the trial,
would review the record and impose the sentence. 3 This procedure will
provide the alleged contemnor with notice and an opportunity to be
heard fully and fairly on the issues. Moreover, this will severely limit
the potential for judicial bias" by providing a different judge or a jury
to hear the contempt proceeding."9 Adoption of this alternative pro-
cedure would not only aid in resolving the inherent constitutional infir-
mities of the present summary procedure, but would also assure effec-
tive trial advocacy.
Richard J. Sax
92. See note 5 supra.
93. See 4 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 74, 94 (1970). See also Summary Contempt Sanc-
tion, supra note 1, at 102.
94. See Summary Contempt Sanction supra note 1, at 102 n.60 ("It is unclear
whether bias will be completely eliminated due to fellow judges' empathy for each other").
95. A recent empirical examination of the summary power made a substantially
similar recommendation. The study states that the central defect in the summary con-
tempt procedure is the power that it vests in the trial judge, thereby creating a fear of
judicial bias or arbitrary use of the power. Concluding that the power is unnecessary and
performs no essential role in controlling courtroom misbehavior, the study suggests that
the present system be replaced with one in which the trial judge cites for contempt, with
a different judge later deciding the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. See DISORDER IN
THE COURT, note 43 supra.

